ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY (397-703 A)
Term-Paper
By
Muhammad Amin A. Samad
*
*
PROF. T. IZUTSU
Montreal, December 16, 1974
*
*
INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC STUDIES
McGILL UNIVERSITY
C O N T E N T S
Page
I.
DEFINITION AND AREAS OF ISLAMIC
PHILOSOPY …………………………………. 2
II.
EXISTING THINGS ………………………….. 2-8
a. Substance
and Accident ……………………. 2
b. واجب الوجود , ممكن الوجود , and ممتنع الوجود …….
6
c. Sensible
and Known by Reason ……………. 7
d. General
and Particular ……………………… 8
e. قديم and حديث ………………………………… 8
III.
WORD, CONCEPT, AND DENOTATUM ….. 9-13
a. لفظ (Word or Term)
…………………………. 9
b. مفهوم (Concept) ………………………………
9
c. مصداق (Denotatum) …………………………. 9
d. متواطئ (Univocal) and مشكك
(Analogos) ……. 9
e. تشكيك (Scepticism) ……………………………. 11
f. ذاتي and عرضي ………………………………. 11
ENDTNOTES …………………………………………… 14
BIBLIOGRAPHY
………………………………………. 15
I.
THE DEFINITION AND THE AREAS OF ISLAMIC
PHILOSOPHY
Philosophy is
acting to bringing the human soul to perfection through the knowledge of
realities of the existing things as they are according to the degree of
human ability. Philosophy, then, is the study of the realities of existing
things as they are (not as they should be) as much as human possibility. Its
goal is to bring the human soul to perfection.
Islamic Philosophy is divided into three areas:
a. Logical
matters, logica (المنطقيات or (علم
المنطق which is a means (a tool) to obtain the other areas of
philosophy.
b. Physical
matters, phisica الطبيعيات)
or (علم الطبيعة
c. Divine
science or divine matters الإلهيات
or (العلم الإلهي .
It is the knowledge of what is beyond nature. It is divided into two
categories:
1.الإلهيات بالمعنى الأعم , divine matters in
more general meaning which is also called الأمور
العامة (general matters), i.e.,
metaphysics, ontology, and science of existence.
2. الإلهيات بالمعنى الأخص, divine matters in
the more particular meaning, theology. In Islam it is called علم الكلام , “the knowledge of argumentation”. It is
the study of the existence of God and what we call His “attributes”. It does
not discuss the Essence of God (الذات الإلهي)
, but it discusses the Essence of God (ذات الله)
as qualified with الصفات , (e.g., الرحمة , القدم
), and الأسماء (e.g., الرحمن
, الرحيم , and (الخالق
. So, علم الكلام is also called “the science of الأسماء andالصفات ”.[1]
II.
EXISTING THINGS
Existing things can be divided into many categories, among
which are as follows:
A. Substance (جوهر)
and Accident (عرض)
i. Substance (جوهر)
Al-Sāwī gives the definition of substance as follows:
الجوهر هو الماهية التي إذا
وجدت في الأعيان كانت لا في موضوع.
He puts في الأعيان (“in the concrete world”) to exclude God
as substance. Qut.b al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī gives the following definition: الجوهر قائم بذات خود (“Substance is something which is standing by
its own self).
There are peculiarities of substance, i.e.:
a. It has no
opposite (ليس له ضد) , e.g., Socrates is not an opposite of Plato.
b. It has no
difference in degree and gradation (ليس له شدة ولا
ضعف) , e.g., a man is not more or less human than another
man.
c. It can be pointed with physical pointing (إشارة بالذات) , e.g., this is a chair.
d. It has
substantial movement (حركة جوهرية)
according to Mulla S.adra, e.g., the apple was a seed, then it became a
green apple, then a red apple. According to other philosophers there is no
substantial movement and there is no gradual process. At the stage of seed it
is a seed and nothing but a seed.
Substance can be divided into مادي (material or physical) and مفارق (non material).
a. Material
substance جوهر مادي)) is divided into: جسم , هيولا
, and صورة
.
b. Non-material
substance (جوهر مفارق) is divided into:
1. نفس . it needs مادة (matter) in its
function. It can manifest its activity
only through the body.
2. عقل . it does not need مادة in its
activity.
Both نفس
and عقل belong to the highest genera (جنس) .
Qut.b al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī divided substance into:
a.
واجب الوجود (the very essence)
b. جسم
which is divided into: جسم , هيولا , and صورة .
c.
نفس
d.عقل
Descartes divided substance
into:
a. Divine
Essence distinguished in His absolute perfection (الذات
الباري) .
b. جسم . Its distinguishing mark is the extension (إمتداد,
بعد).
c. نفس , either نفس or عقل .
The sequence of substance
according to al-Ghazālī is: جوهر مفارق
, then صورة , then جسم
, and then هيولا.[2]
ii. Accident
According to Aristotle there are nine categories of
accident. They are:
1.
كم or الكمية
(quantity). It is an accident which accepts equality and non-equality by
nature. In other words it is dividable. There are two types of this category:
a. الكم المتصل
(continuous quantity). If we divide it into two parts we shall find الحد المشترك (the
common limit), e.g., g 1 A 2 .
A is الحد
المشترك (the common limit), the
end and the beginning of the segment g1 and g2 respectively.
It has two types:
1.
قار (fixed), e.g.,
____.____.____.____.____
2.
غير قار (unfixed), e.g., the division of
time into past and future. We only know and can actualize the past, while the
other part (future) is unknown. past
. future
b. الكم المنفصل (separable quantity), where there is no common limit between them, e.g., o o o o
. o o o o o
2. كيف or الكيفية
(quanatity). It is immovable state of substance which does not accept equality
or non-equality essentially. For example, the redness of a piece of paper does
not admit being divided by dividing the paper. There are four types of this category:
a. كيفية
محسوسة (sensible quality), which
is grasped by any of the five senses. It is either ثابت,
راسخ (deep-rooted, solidly
established), e.g., the sweetness of sugar, the hotness of fire, or غير راسخ , سريع الزوال (easily disappeared),
like the redness of face in anger.
b. كيفية نفسانية (mental quality), either سريع الزوال (disappears easily) like a sudden burst of
anger, or a ملكة which is deeply rooted, like knowledge, and
envy to whom who was born envious.
c. استعراض
or كيفية استعراضية (natural proneness), i.e.,
inborn quality of something by which one strongly resists to be affected, e.g.,
illness (مصحاحية) or easily affected (ممراضية) .
d.
كيفية مختصة بالكمية . It deals with
quantity, e.g., the straightness (الإستقامة) and the bend (الإنحناء) of
something.
3. أين (where). A physical body needs a certain quality (مكان)
which is called أين . This body occupying
a certain place is called متمكن . It is either:
a. أين حقيقي where there is no room for the other body (جسم) , e.g., water in the cup (full of
water), or
b. أين غير
حقيقي where the body occupies only a small room, e.g., I live
in Canada.
4 متي
(when). It is something occupying a certain point of time. It is called متزمن . It is either:
a. زمان حقيقي
, i.e., a portion of timed whose both ends exactly coincide with the
appearance and disappearance of something, e.g., one’s span of life: time . span of life . , or
b. زمان غير
حقيقي , i.e., larger portion of time which comprises a small
portion of time which is in question, e.g., He lived in the 10th
century: time . 10th century ._______
He lived
5. وضع
(position), i.e., the internal relation between the component parts, also
in term of positional relationship of the components with the outside of the
body, e.g., laying down, standing, leaning, upside down, facing
something else, etc.
6. ملك
or جده
or له (possession). This is still ambiguous for Ibn Sīnā, but he
gives his definition: “Possession is being of a substance (A) which covers it
(B), and moves (A) with its (B’s) moving, like somebody being clothed.” It may
be partial, e.g., ….. or
impartial, e.g., …………..
7. أن يفعل
(action), i.e., an action of influence of something upon something else,
e.g., fire exercises influence upon water until it boils.
8. أن ينفعل
(passion), i.e., action of influence upon something from something else,
e.g., water receives influence from fire until it boils (the opposite of
(أن
ينفع.
9. الإضافة
(relation), i.e., if we have something in our mind we have to produce
something else which is essential and related to it. It has two types:
a. إضافة متكررة (bilateral relation),
e.g., if A resembles B, B also resembles A. Therefore, it applies to
mutual resemblance (التشابه)
, opposition (التضاد) , and facing one
another .(الموازاة)
b. إضافة غير متكررة
(unilateral relation). It is the relation between علة (cause) and معلول (effect), e.g.,
relationship between father and son.[3]
In order to apply these accidents in one
substance, if we take الإنسان as our substance, his
being grown up is الكم , his being darker or
the change of his figure is الكيف , having a father and
he might have a son is الإضافة , being in his house
is الأين , his working today or he worked yesterday
is ,متى being standing or
sitting is الوضع, being armed to the
teeth and wearing his clothes is الملك
, being reading or writing is أن يفعل , and his being
slapped or beaten is أن ينفعل .[4]
Sahrfawardi reduced this nine categories
into four: 1. كم 2. كيف 3. الإضافة (including ملك, أين,
متى , and (وضع
, and الحركة (including أن يفعل and .(أن لا يفعل
B. ممكن
الوجود, واجب الوجود and ممتنع الوجود
1. واجب الوجود
is whose existence is necessary (ضروري)
and whose non-existence is absurd .(محال)
Plato called it وجود مطلق . According to
al-Kindi the existence of واجب الوجود
is a decided matter outside reason and imagination.[5]
There are two kinds of واجب الوجود :
a.
واجب الوجود بذاته i.e., an existence exists by itself
(essence), ens per se.
b.
واجب الوجود بغيره , ens per aliut, an
existence exists by other than itself. Since its existence depends upon other
than itself it is also called ممكن لذاته
, e.g., the world.[6]
2. ممكن الوجود
. It is divided into 2 categories:
a. ممكن الوجود بذاته
which is also called واجب الوجود بغيره
, since ممكن here means ممكن
بالقوة .[7]
b. ممكن الوجود
بغيره which is also called ممتنع الوجود
.[8]
Al-Ghazālī gives four
meanings of ممكن الوجود as follows:
a.
الإصطلاح العامي i.e., what is not ممتنع الوجود , which includes واجب
الوجود .
b. الوضع الخاص , i.e., what is equal in both non-impossibility and
unnecessary of its existence or non-existence.
c.
الوضع الأخص i.e., its existence is not necessary
(لاضرورة في وجوده) , e.g., writing
with regard to man.
d. It is
applied to the present non-existence, whose presence is not impossible in the
future. Its existence is ,بالقوة e.g., the existence of the world before it
exists.[9]
3. ممتنع الوجود
. It is divided into two categories:
a. ممتنع
الوجود بذاته , e.g., the impossibility of the union of blackness and
whiteness in something.
b. ممتنع
الوجود بغيره , e.g., the supposition of the occurrence of the day of
resurrection today which is impossible not be its essence, but because God knew
that He would not make it happen today. If God wanted to happen (which is (علة it would happen, and it would become ممكن الوجود. So, every ممتنع
الوجود بغيره will become ممكن الوجود
with the presence of علة .[10]
C.
محسوسة (sensible) and معلومة
بالإستدلال (known by reason)
محسوسة are things known through our five senses. معلومة بالإستدلال are things known through reason, e.g., the
existence of ability, knowledge, willingness, fear, shame, love and anger. Most
of existing things belong to this category.[11]
The best kind of existence according to al-Kindī is the existence of God, and
he believes that it is the object of absolute knowledge ,(المعرفة
اليقينية) and reason alone is the only way to know God.[12]
D.
عام (general) and خاص
(particular)
The existing things in their relation
to each other can be divided into four categories:
a.
أعم (more general), e.g., الحيوان is أعم than الإنسان ………
b. أخص (more particular), e.g., الإنسان
is أخص than حوادث
…..
d. أعم من وجه و أخص من وجه آخر (more general on one
side, and more particular on the other side), e.g., the whiteness of
animals. On one side whiteness is more general, as it includes white paper,
chalk, and many other things which are not animals. On the other side it is more particular, as
it excludes many non-white animals, e.g., black people, black horses,
crows, zebra, etc.[14]
E. قديم
and حديث
Existing things
can be divided into:
1.
القديم (eternally pre-existent) which is divided
into:
a. قديم بحسب الزمان , i.e., there is no beginning of the time of its
existence.
b. قديم بحسب الذ ات , i.e., there is no beginning and cause (علة)
for its essence.
2. الحادث (inci
dental) which is also divided
into:
a. حادث
لزمانه , i.e., there is a beginning for the time of its
existence.
b.
حادث لذ اته , i.e., there
is a beginning for its essence by which it is existent.
According to philosophers the world is حادث بحسب الذات and
قديم بحسب
الزمان ,
while God the creator of the world is قديم بحسب الزمان
والذات .[15]
III. WORD,
CONCEPT, AND DENOTATUM
A. لفظ
(word or term)
Word or term is divided into two categories:
1. جزئي , i.e., it denotes to a single thing, e.g., Zayd,
this tree, that horse.
B. مفهوم
(Concept)
It is the meaning we understand from the word. There is no
word without meaning. It is also divided into:
1. مفهوم جزئي , i.e., it applies to a single thing, it refuses
participation of more than one thing (denotatum,
مصداق ), e.g., Socrates, Plato.
2. مفهوم كلي , i.e., it does not refuse participation of more than
one thing, e.g., الإنسان , it is applicable to
Ali, Ahmad and Zayd (more denoteta).
C. مصداق
(denotatum)
مصداق , denotatum
(pl. مصاديق , denoteta) is the thing denoted by
the meaning of the word, though it does not actually exist in the external
world, e.g., if we say “dragon” the denotatum presented in our
mind is a creature like a crocodile or snake, with wings and claws, able to
breathe out of fire, often guarding a treasure, as we used to read in the
Eastern myth.
D. متواطئ
(univocal) and مشكك (analogos)
Considering the quality and the difference of degrees of
the denoteta of a مفهوم كلي
, it is divided into two categories:
1. متواطئ , i.e., it is applied to denoteta equally,
without making any discrimination, e.g., the word الإنسان is applied to
infinite number of denoteta equally; it is applied to Hasan, John, Ali,
and none of them is more man or less man than the others. The other example is
the table; there is no table more table than other tables.
2. مشكك, i.e., it is applied to denoteta not equally, but
in various degrees, e.g., light may be attributed to the light of the
sun which is strong, and the light of the lamp which is weak (dim).
The
word مشكك means that which makes us doubtful. It
refers to the fact that المفهوم which we do not know
to which degree it is being applied. The concept puts us in doubt to the degree
applied to it. This phenomenon is called تشكيك , and the phenomenon of analogical gradation is called تفاوت. Muslim philosophers give us seven
principles for the تفاوت of the مشكك as follows:
a. أولية (priority), e.g., the hotness of fire has a kind of
priority before the hotness of boiling water, because the hotness of fire is علة (cause) of the hotness of boiling water.
b. أولوية (appropriation), e.g., the existence of the Creator is
more appropriate than that of the creatures, because the former is واجب الوجود , while the latter is ممكن الوجود .
c. أقدمية (temporal priority), e.g., by comparing the existence of
father and son; father is متقدم , while son is متأخر
.[17]
d. أشدية (principal of being
stronger). The classical example is the concept of being white as applied to
snow and ivory. The whiteness of snow is أشد
(stronger) than the whiteness of ivory.
e. أزيدية (quantity), e.g., if A is 5 meters long, and B is 3
meters long, A is أزيد than B, and B is أنقص than A.
f. أكثرية (numbers), e.g., ten is more than six.
g. الغنى و الفقر (independence and lack of independence), e.g., the
existence of جوهر is أغنى than the existence of عرض
. God is غني which means that He is independent upon
others, while the creatures are فقير
, as they are dependent. The existence of عرض
depends upon the existence of جوهر
.
E. التشكيك
(scepticism)
It has three elements:
1. ما به الإشتراك , i.e., a concept
which is applied to all denoteta, e.g., man, stone; the words share in
common in the existence.
2. ما به الأختلاف , i.e., the existence of element of difference among denoteta,
e.g., father and son is different in الزمان
.
3. ما به التشكيك , e.g., the أقدمية
of the father compared to his son.
There are three kinds of تشكيك :
1. تشكيك عام which is understandable
to the common people..
2. تشكيك خاص which is understandable
only to the highly educated people (élite).
3. تشكيك أخص which is understandable
only to the élite of the elite, e.g., the mastery of the absolute reality, the
essence of existence, which is according to Ibn ‘Arabī is nothing but وجود منبسط .
F. ذاتي and عرضي
Ibn Sahlan al-Sawi gives the definition of ذاتي
and عرضي as follows:
الذاتي : هو الذي يفتقر إليه الشيئ في ذاته و ماهيته , و العرضي: هو الذي لا يفتقر إ
ليه الشيئ.
Another definition is:
الذاتي: هو المقبوم أو مقوم الماهية, و العرضي:
غير مقوم الماهية, بل تمام الماهية.
ذاتي is the essential constituent element of
the concept. It is something essentially required by something else, while عرضي is not the essential constituent element.
It is not essentially required by something else.
ذاتي has four basic
features. The lack of any of them ذاتي
will not become ذاتي . They are:
1. , إمتناع الإنفكاك i.e.,
inseparability,
e.g., in الإنسان حيوان , الإنسان is always حيوان ; so, حيوان is ذاتي.
In الإنسان شاب , الإنسان is separable from شاب
; so, شاب is not ذاتي
.
2. عدم التعليل or عدم العلة , i.e., there is no particular cause, as ذاتي cannot be causally explained, e.g., there
is no cause why الإنسان is حيوان in الإنسان حيوان .
3. البداهة , i.e., self-evidence, where proof is not needed, as it
is self-evident that الإنسان is حيوان . The other example is that the triangle has three lines is
self-evident.
4. تقدم عقلي (rational precedence), i.e.,
ذاتي
precedes عرضي rationally, e.g., if we say الإنسان
كاتب the rational concept of الإنسان precedes rationally the concept of .كاتب
There
are two technical terms for ذاتي , i.e.,:
1. ذاتي في باب الإيساغوجي , i.e., ذاتي
as explained in the Eisagogé (, المدخل Introduction to Theory of Logic), and we call it
“ذاتي in the first system.”
2. ذاتي في كتاب البرهان , i.e., ذاتي as explained in the كتاب
البرهان which contains analytica priore (theory of syllogism
without reference to its contents), and analytica posteriora which deals
with contents of reasoning.
ذاتي في باب الإيساغوجي ذاتي عرضي
لوازم
الماهية أو
ذاتي في باب البرهان ذاتي عرضي حق ذات الماهية
According to this system
(which we call the second system) some عرضي
in the first system is ذاتي . It is, in fact, حق ذات الماهية or لوازم الماهية
, i.e., inseparable proportion of الماهية.
If we way “four is an even number”, being even is عرضي
according to the first system (as we can think of number four without thinking
of its evenness), but it is ذاتي according to the
second system, as it belongs to حق ذات الماهية
or لوازم الماهية (the evenness if four
is inseparable from four). The same case is الحركة
with regard to the جسم .
As there are two kinds of ذاتي (i.e., the first and the second
system), there are also two kinds of عرضي:
a.
خارج محمول which is عرضي according to the first system, and ذاتي
according to the second system.
b.
محمول بالضميمة which is عرضي according to both the first and the second system.
According to the Theory of Predicables there
are five كليات in the sense of باب الإيساغوجي , i.e., الكليات
الخمس (the five predicables).
Three of them belong to ذاتي , i.e., ,نوع, جنس and فصل
; the other two belong to عرضي , i.e., عرض عام and عرض خاص
.
1. جنس (genus). It is also called كلي طبيعي
(natural universal). Its denoteta are not individual things, but أنواع (species). It does not represent تمام الماهية , but تمام
المشترك , i.e., the whole body has common elements in the denoteta,
e.g.,
حيوان
ثور (نوع) فرس (نوع)
إنسان (نوع)
2. نوع
(species). It represents تمام الماهية
of individual things, e.g., إنسان
حسن حسين علي
3. فصل
. It represents تمام ما به الإمتياز
. It must fulfil two conditions:
a. It must be a distinguishing factor.
b. It must be ذاتي , e.g., ناطق with regard to الإنسان
.
4. عرض عام
(general or common accident). It is كلي عرضي which is not peculiar to a single denotatum,
but it is common to some others, e.g., أبيض
with regard to الإنسان , as there are many
other white thing are not الإنسان . Another example is ماشي in
regard to .الإنسان
5. عرض خاص or خاصة . It is كلي عرضي
which is peculiar to only one ماهية which is usually نوع
or جنس , e.g., ماشي
in regard to الحيوان .[18]
Al-T.ūsī divided الخاصة into two categories:
a. خاصة شاملة , e.g., ضاحك
which is common to all mankind.
b. خاصة غير شاملة , e.g., كاتب
actually (كاتب بالفغل) with regard to الإنسان
. (كاتب بالقوة belongs to خاصة
شاملة ).
ENDNOTES
[1]Ibn Sīnā gives more details in the
categories of philosophy:
أ- العلم الذى هو الآلة :
المنطق
ب- العلوم التي هي الغاية:
1
– العلوم النظرية: العلم الطبيعي و العلم الرياضي و العلم الإلهي و العلم الكلي
2 -
العلوم العملية: علم الأخلاق و علم تدبير المنزل و علم تدبير المدينة
See Taysīr Shaykh
al-Ard., al-Madkhal ilā Falsafat Ibn Sīnā, 1st ed (Beirut: Dār
al-Anwar, 1967), pp. 184-5.
[3]
Al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id
al-Falāsifah (Cairo, 1936), 2nd ed., pp. 23-5; idem, Mi‘yār
al-‘Ilm, ed. Dr. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1961), pp. 312-3.
[5]يرى {الكندي} وجود
"الواجب" أمرا مقررا خارج الذ هن و التصور , see
Muh.ammad al-Bahī, al-Jānib al-‘Ilāhī min Tafkīr al-Islāmī, (Cairo: ‘Isā
al-Bābī al-H.alabī, 1951), 2nd ed., p. 71.
[6] Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., Madkhal,
pp.210-2; al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id al-Falāsifah, pp. 53ff; al-Ghazālī gives
us the argument why واجب الوجود بغيره is equal
to ممكن
الوجود بذاته as follows:
لأنه إما أن يكون بإعتبار ذاته ممكن الوجود أو واجب
الوجود أو ممتنع الوجود. القسمان الأخيران باطلان: إذ لو كان واجب الوجود بذاته
لما كان واجب الوجود بغيره, ولو كان ممتنع الوجود بذاته لما بصور له ون جود غيره.
و الحاصل أن كل ممكن بذاته فهو واجب بغيره. فلممكن إذا اعتبرت علته وقدر وجودها
كان واجب الوجود. و إذا قدر عدم علته كان ممتنع الوجود, وإن لم يلتفت إلى علتهو لا
بإعتبار العدم ولا بأعتبار الوجود كان له فى ذات المعنى الثالث وهو الإمكان. See al-Ghazālī, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm. pp. 345-6.
[7]Ibn Sīnā gives us two examples for this. He
says:
إن
الأربعة واجبة الوجود, ولكن هذ ا الوجوب ليس لها من ذاتهاو ولكن من فرض اثنين و
اثنين. أما المثل الثاني فيتعلقب بالإحتراق. إن الإحتراق واجب الوجود بيد أن أن
هذا الوجوب ليس له من داته أيضا, و إنما عنننند فرض التقاء القوة الفاعلة للآحتراق
بالطبع. See Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., al-Madkhal,
pp. 210-1.
[8]
Dr. Jamīl S.alībā, Ta’rīkh
al-Falsafah al-‘Arfabīya (Beirut: Dār al-Kuttāb al-Lubnānī, 1970), 1st
ed., p. 221.
[13]By giving this example plants are
considered having no sense at all, though it is said that certain plants have
no sense of feeling.
[17]Many philosophers believe in the أقدمنة العالم which is one of the three views which,
according to al-Ghazālī lead to their believer to infidelity, see al-Ghazālī, al-Munqidh
min al-D.alāl, ed. Dr. Jamīl S.alība and Dr.Kāmil ‘Iyād., 5th
ed. ([Syria]: Mat.ba‘at al-Jāmi‘ah al-Sūrīyah, 1956), p. 79; Dr. Jamīl
S.alībā, Ta’rīkh al-Falsafah, p. 365 ff.
[18]For al-Ghazālī’s definition of each of الكلينات الخمس , see al-Ghazālī, , Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm, pp. 106-7.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bahī, Muh.ammad al-. Al-Jānib al-‘Ilāhī min
Tafkīr al-Islāmī. 2nd ed. Cairo:
‘Isā al-Bābī al-H.alabī, 1951.
Ghazālī, Abū H.āmid al-, Maqās.id al-Falāsifah.
2nd ed. Cairo,
1936.
_______, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm, ed. Dr. Sulaymān Dunyā.
Cairo: Dār
al-Ma‘ārif, 1961.
________, al-Munqidh min al-D.alāl, ed. Dr.
Jamīl S.alība and Dr.Kāmil ‘Iyād., 5th ed. [Syria]: Mat.ba‘at al-Jāmi‘ah
al-Sūrīyah, 1956.
S.alībā, Dr. Jamīl, Ta’rīkh al-Falsafah
al-‘Arabīyah. 1st ed. Beirut: Dār al-Kuttāb al-Lubnānī, 1970.
Shaykh
al-Ard., Taysīr. Al-Madkhal ilā
Falsafat Ibn Sīnā, 1st ed. Beirut:
Dār al-Anwar, 1967.
No comments:
Post a Comment