IBN H.AZM'S CONCEPT OF IJMA'. CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

Ibn H...azm, who revived the Z.āhirī s chool in the fifth/eleventh century in Andalusia, faced severe reaction from his contemporary ‘ulamā ’ and rulers, who considered the Z.āhirī school as an intruding one, for they had already followed the Mālikī school. His motive for propagating and defending this school, which he considers the right one, is political and religious. Political, because, as a pro-Umayyad, he intends to keep the Umayyad caliphate from losing its control in Andalusia. Religious, because he intends to bring the people of Andalusia in general, and its ‘ulamā ’ and rulers in particular, back to the pure Islamic teaching. He believes that the political instability and the corruption in the country are due to the people’s deviation from and violation of the nas.s., i.e., the Qur‘ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet. Because Ibn H.azm believes that politics and religion are inseparable, he confines himself to teaching people the Z.āhirī fiqh to achieve his goal.

Ibn H.azm insists upon the total agreement of Muslims for the occurrence of ijmā ‘. Due to the existence of natural and inherent disagreements and divergences in the human kind, Ibn H.azm insists on nas.s. as the only basis of ijmā‘, for no Muslim should deny its authority. The ijmā‘ maintained by Ibn H.azm is that of the s.ah.ābah in its broad meaning. It comprises two types: a) ijmā‘ on what is known in religion by necessity, like the injunction of five-daily prayers, and b) ijmā‘ of the s.ah.ābah in its narrow meaning, i.e., on what the s.ah.ābah witnessed and heard from the Prophet, like the tax he imposed on the Jews of Khaybar. However, the ‘ulamā’ en masse do not consider this ijmā‘ as such, for it is not more than the transmission of the nas.s. by the s.ah.ābah from the Prophet to their following generation.

Although to some extent there is a similarity of view on ijmā‘ between Ibn H.azm and al-Naz.z.ām as well as al-T.ūsī, this similarity is merely accidental, caused by different motivations and backgrounds. Ibn H.azm, al-Naz.z.ām and al-T.ūsī belong to the Z.āhirī school of law, the Mu‘tazilī school of theology, and the Shī‘ah sect respectively. However, we know that the Mu‘tazilah and the Shī‘ah have similar view on the createdness of the Qur’ān as well as on the names and attributes of Allah.
Basing ijmā‘ on nas.s. alone, i.e., the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, Ibn H.azm asserts that, like the Qur’ān, the Sunnah of the Prophet is also a wah.y and preserved by Allah. The loss of the Sunnah, mutawātir as well as āh.ād, would cause the destruction of religion, because Sunnah provides us with essential details on Allah’s statements and instructions in the Qur’ān for human beings. However, Ibn H.azm maintains that unlike the Qur’ān, the Sunnah is not an established text in the Scripture, and contains no miracle in its structure.

Unlike to opinion of the majority of ‘ulamā’ in accepting khabar al-wāh.id as probable evidence Ibn H.azm considers it as convincing evidence, provided that it was reported by a reliable transmitter, who traced his hearing to the Prophet through reliable transmitters. Ibn H.azm does not accept the validity of z.ann in religion, because he asserts that z.ann is other than the truth and is prohibited by Allah.

Contrary to the opinion of the majority of ‘ulamā’, Ibn H.azm does not accept the taqrīr of the Prophet as h.ujjah, because he contends that whatever the Prophet did not disapprove of is permissible. The Prophet’s fi‘l is considered as mandūb and uswah for Muslims, unless there is an indication of its being wājib, like his execution of a certain injunction. It is the qawl of the Prophet which is accepted by Ibn H.azm as a h.ujjah by itself, while the majority of ‘ulamā’ consider qawl, fi‘l, and taqrīr of the Prophet together as h.ujjah.

Qiyās is rejected by Ibn H.azm as one of the sources of Islamic law or as sanad of ijmā‘, for he considers it as an innovation and superfluous to religion. He maintains that whatever Allah does not state as something enjoined or prohibited is permissible, and as Allah has perfected the religion of Islam, any law based on other than nas.s., is to be rejected. The existence of an ‘illah upon which qiyās is based, is rejected by Ibn H.azm.

Although al-T.ūsī and al-Naz.z.ām share the view of Ibn H.azm in rejecting qiyās, they differ in their solving an emerging issue, which is usually solved by the majority of ‘ulamā’ by applying qiyās. Ibn H.azm will exercise ijtihād to find its legal judgement based on nas.s.. If he does not find any dalīl in the nas.s., the issue is considered permissible, which is the basic legal judgement of everything. Al-T.ūsī will try to find the opinion of the hidden imām on the issue. But if it is still unknown, it will be revealed in the ijmā‘ of the ‘ulamā’ of the Shī‘ah. If no agreement has been reached, the opinion of the imām will be with one which has dalālah from the nas.s.. If no dalālah is available, the opinion of those who are unknown in person and by lineage is with that of the imām. If the groups of disagreeing ‘ulamā’ consist of both known and unknown ‘ulamā’, the opinion of any group is accepted. Although the opinion of the imām is not with any of the disagreeing groups, their opinions are permitted. Otherwise, if they are not permitted, the imām should not remain silent any longer. The opinion of al-Naz.z.ām on this issue is unknown. However, he accepts the statements of the hidden imām as h.ujjah, as asserted by al-Shahrastānī.

Other than the ijmā‘ which he advocates, i.e., ijmā‘ of the s.ah.ābah based on nas.s., Ibn H.azm rejects ijmā‘ and its authority. Dealing with ijmā‘ of the people of Madīnah, he asserts that ijmā‘ of the people of Makkah is more deserving of acceptance than that of Madīnah, if the ijmā‘ of the people of Madīnah should be accepted. Moreover, Ibn H.azm protests that there were hypocrites and Rawāfid. in Madīnah. Asserting the occurrence of ijmā‘ merely because no challenge is known is also rejected by Ibn H.azm. For him, the absence of challenge in ijmā‘ does not necessarily indicate one’s agreement, but it may indicate his fear. Furthermore, a challenge might not reach the ‘ulamā’ in their ijmā‘, so that they assume its absence. Ibn H.azm reminds his opponents of the existence of ‘ulamā’ among jinn whose agreement or challenge has never been known to them. Knowing the opinions of all the ‘ulamā’ of Islam is impossible due to their greatness in number, except those of the s.ah.ābah before they scattered to different points outside Madīnah. Like the opinion of the majority of ‘ulamā’, Ibn H.azm also rejects ijmā‘ with one challenge. The idea that a single challenge must be shudhūdh is rejected by Ibn H.azm, for the truth might be with the single challenger. The shudhūdh which is intended in the h.adīth cited by his opponents, if that h.adīth should be accepted, is understood by him to be “disagreeing with the truth.” But he doubts the soundness of that h.adīth as well as another h.adīth which orders the believers to follow the jamā‘ah cited by his opponents. However, he contends that the jamā‘ah intended in the h.adīth is jamā‘atu’l-h.aqq. In its general meaning, jamā‘atu’l-h.aqq denotes the Muslim community as the opposite of the non-Muslim community. In its particular meaning, it means any group among the Muslim community who follow the Qur’ān and h.adīths of the Prophet in contrast to Muslim heretics and those who follow fabricated h.adīths.

To what extent is the Z.āhirīsm of Ibn H.azm similar to that of its founder, Abū Sulaymān Dāwūd, is beyond the scope of this study. However, we know that Ibn H.azm follows Dāwūd in rejecting qiyās, ra’y, istih.sān, and taqlīd, and in accepting the ijmā‘ of the s.ah.ābah. This type of ijmā‘ which is considered the third source of Islamic law, is of minor importance. His opponents do not even consider it as ijmā‘, but rather as the nas.s. itself. The dalīl, the fourth source of Islamic law in the Z.āhirī school, is considered by Ibn H.azm’s opponents as qiyās in disguise, although it is also based on nas.s.. In this instance we may say that Ibn H.azm, as a Z.āhirī, sticks to the nas.s. alone. In one of his poems he said: “I will not incline towards any opinion in religion; nay, the Qur’ān and the Sunan [of the Prophet] suffice me,” as we have cited on the front page of this book.